According to a report by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), from 2019 to 2023, India was the world's largest arms importer. In percentage terms, India accounted for 11% of total global arms imports. However, the explicit financial figures are not readily visible in the SIPRI report. A recent indicator of India's defense spending was the discussion surrounding Prime Minister Modi's visit to France, during which India was reportedly set to purchase 26 Rafale M fighter jets (the marine version of Rafale) and submarines under Project 75, with an estimated cost of ₹63,000 crore.
Given the number of such deals India signs annually, the country incurs a massive expenditure on defense imports. Despite the focus on "Make in India" and "Atmanirbhar Bharat" (Self-Reliant India), India's dependence on foreign military equipment remains high. This raises concerns about the effectiveness of indigenous organizations like DRDO and HAL.
India's indigenous fighter jet program has faced significant delays. The country developed its first supersonic fighter jet, HF-24 Marut, in the 1950s, which served until the 1970s. In 1983, the Indian Air Force (IAF) planned a new fighter jet to replace the aging MiG-21 fleet. However, the LCA Tejas Mk1, conceived in 1983, saw its prototype unveiled only in 2001—18 years later. It took another 15 years (2016) for its induction into the IAF. Even after nine years, IAF Chief Air Marshal A.P. Singh stated that HAL has not delivered even 40 jets out of the ordered quantity, expressing his loss of faith in HAL.
Comparing this with France’s Rafale production, India placed an order for 36 Rafale jets in 2016, and France delivered them all within six years, by December 15, 2022. This raises concerns about India's ability to meet its defense requirements through domestic production.
The current debate revolves around whether India should purchase the F-35 offered by the U.S. or the Su-57 from Russia. The F-35 comes with no additional benefits, while the Su-57 deal includes the transfer of technology (ToT), which aligns with India's goal of self-reliance.
However, the fundamental question remains—why do India's defense research organizations continue to lag? Why does DRDO and HAL struggle with efficiency, and should privatization be considered? India's defense industry remains highly controlled by the government, and inefficiencies have led to significant delays in crucial projects.
Despite having a much larger budget than ISRO, DRDO has not shown proportionate advancements. The government has formed a new committee to analyze these issues, and its recommendations will be crucial in determining the future of India's defense research sector.
India established DRDO on January 1, 1958, by merging the Defense Science Organization (DSO) and the Indian Army's Technical Development Establishment (TDE). Initially, it was a small research cell under the Ministry of Defense with just 10 scientists and researchers. Today, DRDO has grown into a massive organization with over 50,000 scientists and engineers.
Between 1958 and 1965, DRDO primarily focused on missile and avionics research. However, India's first major setbacks came during the 1962 Indo-China War and the 1965 Indo-Pak War, highlighting the country's heavy dependence on foreign defense equipment.
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During the 1962 war, India realized the significant lack of modern warfare technology. Due to this, the scope of DRDO was expanded, making it India's primary defense R&D agency.
One of DRDO's biggest revolutions came in the 1980s with the launch of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP). This was the most ambitious project in DRDO’s history, led by Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, laying the foundation for India as a self-reliant missile power.
Another major milestone was the Pokhran-II nuclear tests on May 11, 1998. DRDO played a crucial role in their success, making India an officially recognized nuclear-armed state. To maintain secrecy, DRDO scientists disguised themselves as road construction engineers to avoid suspicion, a strategic move that ensured the tests remained undetected.
In the 21st century, DRDO witnessed several more revolutions between 2000-2010, including:
- BrahMos supersonic missile (a joint venture between India & Russia, first tested on June 12, 2001)
- Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) (developed with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited)
- INS Arihant, India’s first nuclear-powered submarine
- Advanced UAVs such as Rustom and Netra drones to enhance surveillance capabilities
- The biggest recent milestone: successful night trial of Agni-V missile on October 21, 2022, with a 5000 km range, acting as a strong deterrent against China and Pakistan.
Challenges Facing DRDO
Despite these achievements, DRDO faces several bureaucratic hurdles. Ideally, India should have a battlefield scenario where:
- Tejas fighters dominate enemy aircraft
- Indian-designed helicopters destroy enemy tanks & troops
- Arjun tanks rain down 120mm shells
- Indian soldiers rely on DRDO-developed weapons and performance-enhancing technology
However, ground reality is different. Experts argue that DRDO is stuck in bureaucratic inefficiency, preventing it from reaching its full potential.
1. Political Leadership Issues
One major problem is that India's Defense Ministry is often led by politicians without military backgrounds. For example:
- Mulayam Singh Yadav, a teacher by profession, served as Defense Minister
- A.K. Antony, had no military or strategic experience, which slowed down defense acquisitions during the UPA era
- Nirmala Sitharaman and Rajnath Singh, though strong leaders, lack personal experience in military operations
Experts believe that just as S. Jaishankar, an experienced diplomat, transformed India's foreign policy, a military strategist should lead the Defense Ministry. Gen. V.K. Singh, a retired Army General with hands-on experience in border security and military operations, could have been an ideal candidate. If someone with such expertise had been appointed, India’s military modernization and strategic planning could have advanced significantly.
2. Budget & Efficiency Issues
For 2023-24, DRDO’s budget was ₹22,264 crore, a significant allocation for defense R&D. However, ISRO, with a much lower budget of ₹11,700 crore, has achieved far greater global success—proving that the problem is not just funding but inefficient resource utilization.
- DRDO suffers from delays and cost overruns
- Instead of focusing solely on world-class defense systems, DRDO has been engaged in making sanitizers, masks, and food research, raising concerns about misallocation of efforts
- Experts argue that some DRDO labs focus on non-defense areas, diluting its core purpose
3. Delays in Defense Projects
Many critical defense projects in India have been delayed due to inefficiencies in DRDO... (continues)
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Equal opportunity is not given, whereas Tata Advanced Systems has done significant work on projects like Akash missile launchers and MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones. L&T has also built Scorpion-class submarines and K9 Vajra howitzers. However, DRDO has always been hesitant to collaborate with the private sector. Unless private companies and startups work together, how will new ideas and fast executions emerge?
Now, if we look at ISRO’s model, it has included startups and private industries in its projects and has now become a major player in the global space industry. If you analyze DRDO’s budget, it should invest 30-50% in private partnerships and academic tie-ups so that a new era of defense R&D can begin.
The next major challenge is the "copy syndrome." If a country develops something new today, by the time we start developing the same thing, we are already 15 years behind. Since that system is already available in the market, the armed forces can buy it. But should they develop new technologies for the future, or should they spend 15 years replicating what another country has already made? By the time our version is ready, the competing country will have developed the next generation.
A major question arises—should DRDO focus on its strong areas where it can innovate, or should it work on technologies that no other country will provide?
Another major challenge is technological focus. Future warfare will not be fought just with tanks and fighter jets but also in domains like AI, quantum computing, hypersonics, and cyber warfare. DRDO successfully tested its Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) at Mach 6 speed in 2020, which was a good start. However, China has already operationalized its DF-ZF hypersonic missile system since 2021, with speeds ranging from Mach 5 to Mach 10.
In AI warfare, DRDO has initiated projects like Project Sanjay and Rustam-2 drones, but these have not yet reached large-scale deployment. To become future-ready, DRDO must aggressively invest in AI and quantum communication, which is currently not happening.
Another major weakness of DRDO is accountability and leadership. In 2022, an RTI revealed that most of DRDO's leadership is aged 55 and above, slowing down decision-making and innovation. Some projects, like the Nag missile, took years in development with no accountability, forcing India to import Israeli Spike missiles at additional cost.
A significant issue is budget allocation. In DRDO's 2023-24 budget of ₹22,264 crore, only 50% is allocated for major strategic projects. Many projects have wasted over ₹1,000 crore, such as the Nishant UAV, which was shelved in 2017. China spends ₹144 lakh crore annually on defense R&D, while India’s investment is only around ₹1 lakh crore. If DRDO allocates 70% of its budget to strategic, high-impact projects, the impact could be huge.
Another major missed opportunity is the lack of export-oriented R&D. A prime example is the BrahMos missile, where India signed a $375 million export deal with the Philippines, and countries like Indonesia and the UAE are also interested. Vietnam and Armenia want to buy Akash surface-to-air missiles. According to the SIPRI report, many countries want Indian-made missiles and radar systems. If DRDO designs systems not just for India but also for the global export market, India could become a major defense exporter.
So, what are the solutions? DRDO needs modernization and restructuring. Several committees, like the Kargil Committee and the present Vijay Raghavan Committee, have recommended that DRDO adopt a DARPA-style restructuring like the US. This means creating domain-based specialized clusters with active private sector and startup involvement.
The government has already corporatized the Ordnance Factory Board, which was a good move. Similarly, DRDO must become a professional, mission-driven institution. Earlier, defense manufacturing factories operated under government departments, but now they have been consolidated into seven corporate divisions based on their functions and production. Each has its balance sheet and profit-and-loss account, and they must compete with the private sector for orders.
To move forward, the Vijay Raghavan panel’s first recommendation is to reorganize DRDO’s structure. Currently, DRDO has over 50 separate labs working independently, leading to a lack of coordination and duplication of efforts. For example, both the Advanced Systems Laboratory and the Defense Research & Development Laboratory work on missile propulsion separately, leading to wasted efforts and unnecessary delays in projects like the Nag anti-tank missile.
If DRDO reorganizes these labs into around seven major clusters, such as missiles, naval systems, AI and cyber warfare, hypersonics, and space tech, efficiency will increase. The cluster model has already proven successful in the development of Agni and BrahMos missiles.
However, restructuring alone is not enough. Another major problem is delays in projects. In India, the defense project cycle follows a pattern: a project starts, gets delayed, its budget increases, and then imports become necessary. The Tejas LCA is a prime example—it was conceived in 1983 but inducted into service in 2016, leading to a 40-year delay and forcing India to spend over ₹50,000 crore on Mirage 2000 fighter jets. Similarly, the Kaveri engine project launched in 1989 was later abandoned in favor of importing engines from General Electric.
These delays increase project costs. However, DRDO is capable of delivering on time. A success story is the Agni-5 ICBM, developed in just 10 years because a dedicated and accountable project team was assigned to it. This shows that strict timelines and professional project managers can prevent delays and budget overruns.
Another major drawback of DRDO is its lack of collaboration with industry and academia. Today, innovation means collaboration. Even outside DRDO, Indian private companies and startups have achieved major breakthroughs. For instance, Tata Advanced Systems has worked on Akash missile launchers, L&T has developed Scorpion-class submarines and K9 Vajra howitzers, and startups like NewSpace Research and Technologies have developed swarm drones like Sheshnag 150.
IIT Bombay has collaborated with DRDO on hypersonic scramjet engines. If DRDO invests 30-50% of its budget in industry and academia partnerships, it could usher in a new era of research and developments.
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